On Cross-Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, No. 09-89 (U.S. Sept. 8, 2009) by Cole, David
Georgetown University Law Center
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW
2009
On Cross-Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, No.
09-89 (U.S. Sept. 8, 2009)
David Cole
Georgetown University Law Center, cole@law.georgetown.edu
Docket No. 09-89
This paper can be downloaded free of charge from:
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/scb/68
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author.
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/scb
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons

	


	



		

	


	



	
	

	

	
	



		








 !" #$%
#& $' ()
*+,) ( $
- ) $ .+ 
,/*'(01
2003--04
2%%*(*,!# ! 5(6,' 3
	7

8
9
	
---8$,%),.4(/"!$
 )$:110
20103-1;-;0

	99
	8

		99
40<# ,9$(,!:
 *# ,!*"$*,01
2<13<-4<1
8
;0,(,*#,8!+%*( ==
,(,*#,,!*"$*,;1
2<13<<<==

	
7

4=+  "(/ > $*#,
 )$: )$:11
20103000=

9

 i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
Argument.................................................................. 1 
Conclusion .............................................................. 12 
 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
 
Cases: ................................................................ Page 
 
Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 291 F.3d 1000  
(7th Cir. 2002) .........................................................2 
 
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640  
(2000) .......................................................................  9 
 
Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2006) 
............................................................................... 1, 5 
 
FCC v. League of Women Voters of California,  
468 U.S. 364 (1984) ............................................ 8, 10 
 
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983)................ 1 
 
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137  
(1999) ........................................................................4 
 
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) ................. 10 
 
Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974) ........................ 1 
 
People=s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep=t of State,  
327 F.3d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ...............................  2 
 
Simon and Schuster v. State Crime Victims Bd.,  
502 US 105 (1991) .................................................... 9 
 ii 
United States v. Assi, 414 F. Supp. 2d 707  
(E.D. Mich. 2006)...................................................... 2 
 
United States v. Awan, 459 F. Supp. 2d 167 
(E.D.N.Y. 2006) …………………………………………2 
 
United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316  
(4th Cir. 2004), vacated on other grounds,   
543 U.S. 1097, reinstated in relevant part,  
405 F.3d 1034 (4th Cir. 2005) .............................. 2, 3 
 
United States v. Marzook, 383 F. Supp. 2d 1056  
(N.D. Ill. 2005) ......................................................... 2 
 
United States v. O=Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) ...... 11 
 
United States v. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d 348 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) ........................................................ 3 
 
United States v. Shah, 474 F. Supp. 2d 492  
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) ......................................................... 2 
 
United States v. Taleb-Jedi, 566 F. Supp. 2d 157 
(E.D.N.Y. 2008) ........................................................ 2 
 
United States v. Warsame, 537 F. Supp. 2d 1005  
(D. Minn. 2008) ........................................................ 2 
 
Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman 
Estates, Inc.  455 U.S. 489 (1982) ............................ 5 
 
Statutes: 
 
18 U.S.C. ' 2339B............................................... 1, 10 
 
 iii 
18 U.S.C. ' 2339A..................................................... 2 
 
Federal Rules of Evidence: 
 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 ......................... 4, 6, 7 
 
ARGUMENT 
 
 Plaintiffs’ cross-petition is only conditional. 
Plaintiffs oppose the grant of the government’s own 
petition, which seeks review of the court of appeals’ 
narrow holding that three provisions of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2339B are vague as applied to plaintiffs’ specific 
proposed pure speech.  Pet. App. 5a n.1 (specifying the 
narrow scope of plaintiffs’ intended speech activities at 
issue). In opposing plaintiffs’ cross-petition, the 
government stresses that plaintiffs’ contention “that 
the statute is vague as applied to their desired conduct 
… is the only issue that was reached by the court 
below” in ruling on vagueness.  U.S. Opp. 16.  That is a 
good argument for denying the government’s petition, 
because the court’s limited as-applied ruling leaves the 
statute facially valid, cannot offer plaintiffs or anyone 
else protection for any conduct other than the pure 
speech specifically identified, and thus threatens none 
of the national security interests that the government 
invokes.1 But if the Court decides to grant review of 
the three provisions the court of appeals invalidated as 
applied, the government has offered no sound reason 
why it should not also grant review of the cross-
petition, which challenges two other closely related and 
overlapping provisions of the same statute on the same 
grounds.   
 
                                                 
1
 As-applied vagueness challenges are by definition limited to the specific 
conduct at issue.  See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 370 (1983); 
Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756 (1974); Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 
490 (2d Cir. 2006) (per Sotomayor, J.). The court of appeals neither read the 
injunction (which covers only the plaintiffs) as broader than the conduct 
described at Pet. App. 5a n.1 nor upheld it more broadly, leaving open for 
future cases any constitutional challenges relating to any other conduct 
plaintiffs or others may propose. 
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1. The government first asserts that the 
upholding of the criminal proscriptions on “advice … 
derived from scientific [or] technical … knowledge” and 
on providing “personnel” should not be reviewed 
because it involves only “the application of settled law.” 
U.S. Opp. 9. The government cites a number of 
decisions (id. at 10-11) and suggests that courts have 
routinely rejected plaintiffs’ challenges.  In fact, none 
of those cases even addressed the validity of the 
“personnel” or “expert advice” provision as applied to 
speech in support of lawful, nonviolent activity.  
Rather, every cited case that even involved Section 
2339B alleged materially different conduct – either the 
donation of money or support intended to further 
unlawful violent activities.2  
 
                                                 
2
 United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2004), vacated on other 
grounds, 543 U.S. 1097, reinstated in relevant part, 405 F.3d 1034 (4th Cir. 
2005) (donation of money); People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep’t of 
State, 327 F.3d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (organization’s challenge to 
designation); Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 291 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(private suit, involving sending funds); United States v. Taleb-Jedi, 566 F. 
Supp. 2d 157 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (defendant accused of being “part of the 
leadership council” of a terrorist organization and assisting directly in its 
operations); United States v. Warsame, 537 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (D. Minn. 
2008) (defendant sent money and attended al Qaeda training camps; court 
explains that a mere allegation of teaching English would not survive an as-
applied vagueness challenge); United States v. Shah, 474 F. Supp. 2d 492 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (defendant accused of providing medical assistance to 
wounded al Qaeda fighters, helping return them to fight, with intent to 
further al Qaeda’s illegal objectives); United States v. Awan, 459 F. Supp. 2d 
167 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (defendant provided currency and personnel, and was 
prosecuted under a different statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, which requires 
proof of intent to support illegal terrorist activities); United States v. Assi, 
414 F. Supp. 2d 707 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (defendant transported equipment, 
including global positioning satellite device, night vision goggles, and 
thermal imaging camera intended to support Hizballah militant operations); 
United States v. Marzook, 383 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (defendant, 
inter alia, provided money and scouted locations for terrorist attacks).  
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In the government's principal circuit-court case, 
United States v. Hammoud, the court pointedly noted 
that only money was involved and that a more 
demanding constitutional standard would apply if 
speech were at issue.3  And in the only case of which 
we are aware where the government did include pure 
speech within a Section 2339B prosecution, the district 
court held the statute’s “personnel” provision vague as 
applied (before the 2004 addition of a definition, but 
discussing a similar definition proposed by the 
government).  United States v. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d 
348 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). The government did not even 
appeal that decision, but instead re-indicted the 
defendants under a separate statute for intentional 
support of terrorist activities. Conspicuously, the 
government does not even cite Sattar.  
 
Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s upholding of these 
provisions as applied to plaintiffs’ pure speech is in no 
sense “settled law.”  Indeed, no other cited authority 
holds that human rights advocacy can be criminally 
proscribed by a content-based prohibition on “expert 
advice” and an association-based prohibition on 
“personnel.”  
 
2.  The government argues that plaintiffs’ cross-
petition challenges are not sufficiently related to the 
government’s own challenge to warrant review 
together. U.S. Opp. 11-14.  In fact, all of the arguments 
that plaintiffs have advanced with respect to the three 
provisions at issue in the government’s petition – 
vagueness and non-vagueness alike – are equally 
applicable to the two provisions at issue on the cross-
petition. And the provisions are interrelated and 
                                                 
3 381 F.3d at 328 n.3, 330 n.4. 
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overlapping, making review of some without review of 
the others necessarily incomplete.   
 
 With respect to vagueness, the government 
acknowledges that the “specialized knowledge” and 
“scientific [or] technical … knowledge” parts of the 
“advice” definition are intertwined; indeed, they are all 
part of the same clause. U.S. Opp. 13-14.  The 
government suggests that the Court “can” nonetheless 
assume the latter terms’ constitutionality and, on that 
basis, assess the vagueness of the former; and it 
suggests that the Court could in any event hold the 
cross-petition as to the latter to await a decision on the 
former. U.S. Opp. 14 & n.3. But neither course is 
sensible compared to the alternative of considering the 
“advice” definition as a whole, as Congress wrote it – 
and as plaintiffs must confront it.  
 
The government admits that the three terms 
defining “expert advice” “inform” each others’ meaning, 
making consideration of the full “advice” definition a 
sounder basis for decision. U.S. Opp. 13. And in the 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 context, where a similar 
(but not identical) phrase appears, this Court has 
recognized the artificiality of drawing distinctions 
among the three categories, as the government itself 
recognizes.  U.S. Opp. 15, discussing Kumho Tire Co. v. 
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).   
 
 The vagueness of the “personnel” provision is 
also interrelated with the vagueness of the provisions 
at issue in the government’s petition.  As a practical 
matter, for plaintiffs to engage in much of the speech 
they propose, they may have to coordinate and consult 
with the designated organizations.  The “personnel” 
 5 
provision provides plaintiffs and other ordinary 
citizens no guidance as to what kinds of coordination 
and consultation might be charged as criminal.  And 
the terms’ vagueness is exacerbated by their 
interconnections. Thus, while the “personnel” provision 
says that “entirely independent” activity will not be 
prosecuted, the government has contended that any 
activity done “for the benefit of” a designated group is a 
proscribed “service.” The combination of these 
provisions renders it impossible to determine whether 
advocacy that benefits the Kurdistan Workers’ Party 
will be seen as a proscribed “service” or permitted 
“entirely independent” activity.  In short, the fact that 
plaintiffs must navigate all five overlapping and 
potentially contradictory definitions heightens the 
vagueness of each. This Court should therefore 
consider all five provisions if it decides to review the 
three provisions at issue in the government’s petition. 
 
 Plaintiffs’ non-vagueness challenges to the 
“scientific and technical knowledge” and “personnel” 
provisions are also interrelated with the issues in the 
government’s petition, No. 08-1498. Plaintiffs’ non-
vagueness challenges are already present in that case, 
as alternative defenses of the judgment.  Beyond that, 
the government itself recognized the interrelationship 
of the non-vagueness and vagueness issues when it 
affirmatively addressed First Amendment issues other 
than vagueness in its petition.  Pet. 19-23.  Moreover, 
as the court of appeals properly recognized, the 
stringency of vagueness review itself clearly depends 
on whether First Amendment interests are implicated. 
 See Plaintiffs’ Opp. in No. 08-1498, at 22-23; Village of 
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.  455 
U.S. 489, 499 (1982); Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d at 485. 
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Plaintiffs’ non-vagueness challenges to the two 
provisions upheld and the three provisions invalidated 
are closely interrelated.  Thus, “advice” “derived from 
… other specialized knowledge” and “advice” “derived 
from scientific [or] technical … knowledge” both 
discriminate based on content; whether any particular 
advice is forbidden turns on an assessment of its 
content.  Similarly, the “personnel” prohibition and the 
prohibitions on “training,” “services,” and “expert 
advice” derived from “specialized knowledge” all 
discriminate based on protected association and on the 
identity of the intended audience.  Each provision 
prohibits speech only when it is communicated to or 
expressed in association with a proscribed group.   
   
In short, for vagueness and non-vagueness 
grounds alike, the petition and cross-petition are 
interlinked and should be considered together if at all. 
 
3.  The government’s merits defenses of the two 
rulings challenged in the cross-petition (U.S. Opp. 14-
19) only highlight the errors in those rulings. 
 
 The government tacitly confesses the inadequacy 
of the court of appeals’ vagueness reasoning with 
respect to “advice … derived from scientific [or] 
technical … knowledge.”  The government does not 
mention, much less attempt to defend, the court’s mere 
reliance, without analysis, on the fact that “scientific” 
and “technical” appear on elementary-school 
vocabulary lists.   U.S. Opp. 15-17.   
 
The government asserts that the “expert advice” 
definition is not vague because that definition appears 
in Fed. R. Evid. 702 (the very same argument it makes 
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in its petition).  U.S. Opp. 15-16.  That is doubly 
incorrect.  First, in vagueness law, a criminal 
prohibition on speech addressed to ordinary citizens is 
judged under an especially demanding standard, one 
not remotely applicable to the Rules of Evidence, 
addressed to lawyers and judges and without 
sanctions. The government’s blindness to context 
would mean that a law criminalizing the publication of 
news reflecting “scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge” would survive a vagueness 
challenge simply because it mirrored Rule 702.  That is 
contrary to the settled law that criminal proscriptions 
of speech trigger sterner vagueness standards.  See 
page 5, supra.   
 
Second, Rule 702 is limited to scientific, 
technical, and specialized knowledge itself; it does not 
call for a determination of what information is “derived 
from” such knowledge – a far more open-ended and 
indeterminate inquiry.  The government insists that 
the “derived from” standard must proscribe something 
less than “all knowledge,” Opp. 16, but offers no 
explanation of how to determine which knowledge the 
“derived from” standard encompasses.   
 
With respect to the “personnel” prohibition, the 
government concedes that it cannot answer any of the 
questions plaintiffs raised about where one draws the 
line between “direction or control” and “entirely 
independently.”  Thus, it cannot say whether 
consulting with a designated group regarding an op-ed 
and accepting a suggested edit would violate the law or 
not. It contends that these are merely factual questions 
to be resolved at trial, U.S. Opp. 14-15, but that 
response confirms, rather than answers, the vagueness 
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problem. Either accepting the edit violates the 
standard or it does not – and the government cannot 
say.  If the standards themselves cannot be specified, 
no amount of factual development will resolve the 
issue.   
 
The government notes that not all uncertainties 
about the scope of these provisions affect the particular 
speech plaintiffs propose.  U.S. Opp. 16.  But ample 
uncertainties do.  Plaintiffs must guess at whether 
speech on human rights, the negotiation of peace 
treaties, or requests for humanitarian assistance in 
any way derive from “scientific” or “technical” 
knowledge including matters of complicated economics, 
political science, and natural resource allocations.  And 
the provision of virtually any assistance will require 
some coordination with the designated groups, risking 
prosecution under the “personnel” standard if plaintiffs 
guess wrong as to how much coordination is permitted. 
  
The government’s responses to plaintiffs’ non-
vagueness challenges fare no better.  It asserts that the 
provisions are not content-based, U.S. Opp. 17, but 
cannot explain how one could even begin to assess 
whether speech is derived from “scientific” or 
“technical” knowledge without examining its content. 
Content that is not derived from such knowledge is 
permitted, while content so derived is proscribed.  This 
is the very definition of content-based discrimination.  
FCC v. League of Women Voters of California, 468 U.S. 
364, 383 (1984). 
 
 The government asserts that the statute is “not 
aimed at speech.”  U.S. Opp. 17.  That claim fails on its 
face where, as here, a statute expressly targets 
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“advice” and “training” for criminal proscription.  The 
express listing of speech as a criminal activity is not 
altered by the fact that other activity is also 
criminalized, or by the assertion of a speech-neutral 
purpose (which may enter into assessment of potential 
justifications, but does not eliminate the need for strict 
First Amendment scrutiny where speech is targeted).  
See Simon and Schuster v. State Crime Victims Bd., 
502 US 105, 117 (1991) (rejecting argument that 
neutral purpose saves statute targeting speech from 
First Amendment invalidation); Boy Scouts of America 
v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 659 (2000) (quoted in Plaintiffs’ 
Opp. in No. 08-1498 at 25-26).  And given the statute’s 
plain terms, it is manifestly false to suggest the statute 
directly proscribes only “conduct,” as distinct from 
speech.  U.S. Opp. 17. 
 
 The government asserts that individuals are free 
to “express their solidarity with any designated group” 
or “express virulent messages of support for the group’s 
terrorist activity,” and claims that this “ability to 
speak removes any possibility that the government is 
targeting speech or viewpoint, instead of action.”  U.S. 
Opp. 17-18. But it is not even clear that the law 
permits such speech – if it is deemed to be “for the 
benefit of” a designated group, it will constitute a 
proscribed “service,” according to the government’s 
definition of that term, and if it is coordinated, it may 
constitute proscribed “personnel.” Plaintiffs’ Opp. in 
No. 08-1498 at 20-22, 29-30. In any event, the two 
kinds of speech identified as permissible by the 
government are not remotely the only kinds of speech 
the Constitution protects. That a statute permits some 
forms of speech does not save it from First Amendment 
scrutiny where it criminally prohibits other forms, 
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such as speech to members of the organizations, 
especially where, as here, it does so on the basis of 
content.   
 
In addition, the prohibitions plaintiffs challenge 
criminalize speech based on its target audience.  The 
very same speech (expert advice, or training for the 
benefit of a designated group) is permitted when 
offered to one audience, such as the (nondesignated) 
Palestine Liberation Organization, but proscribed 
when communicated to another, say the Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party.  The First Amendment generally bars 
the government from dictating a speaker’s chosen 
audience. See FCC v. League of Women Voters of 
California, 468 U.S. at 384 (ban on editorializing 
denies “the right to address their chosen audience on 
matters of public importance”) (emphasis added); 
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 335 (2003) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (a law 
“that would allow a speaker to say anything he 
chooses, so long as his intended audience could not 
hear him,” would be “unconstitutional under any 
known First Amendment theory”). 
 
 The government asserts that, if the intermediate 
scrutiny standard applies, the provisions of Section 
2339B, including those at issue here, pass muster 
under the standard. U.S. Opp. 18. In doing so, it 
retreats to the generality that the statute is aimed “at 
stopping aid to terrorists.”  Id.  But it never says what 
interest Congress had, or even asserted, when the 
particular aid takes the form of pure speech, like 
plaintiffs’ proposed speech, that, among other things, 
positively promotes reduction of terrorist activities.  
Nor does it explain how such a restriction of pure 
 11 
speech is either “unrelated to the suppression of free 
expression” or “no greater than is essential to the 
furtherance of that interest.”  United States v. O’Brien, 
391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).  
  
 The government argues that the statute avoids 
imposing guilt by association because it forbids aid 
only to organizations designated as engaging in 
terrorist activity, and requires that the individual act 
with knowledge that the organization has been so 
designated. U.S. Opp. 18-19. But the same was true of 
the many anti-Communist laws this Court invalidated, 
or construed to require proof of specific intent to 
further unlawful activities. Cross-Petition at 11 n.10. 
The government does not explain how, as a practical 
matter, one can square the right to associate with a 
designated group and the “personnel” clause’s 
prohibition on acting in any way under its “direction or 
control” or the “expert advice” prohibition on all speech 
to the group that derives from “technical” or “scientific” 
knowledge. 
 
The government closes its opposition with the 
assertion that “there can be no serious argument that 
providing direct support to known or designated 
terrorists” cannot be “’otherwise innocent conduct.’”  
U.S. Opp. 19 (emphasis added). But that assertion, 
stopping at the statutory term “support,” ignores the 
actual reach of the defined coverage of that term, 
which includes pure speech aimed at encouraging only 
nonviolent, peaceful activities, and discouraging resort 
to violence.  The government offers no reason why that 
conduct is anything but “otherwise innocent.” It is only 
such pure speech that is at issue here.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
For all of the above reasons, the cross-petition 
for a writ of certiorari should be granted if the Court 
grants the petition in No. 08-1498.  
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